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Abstract  
We investigate the socioeconomic urban scaling behavior in three European Union 
countries: Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands. In the case of Denmark our analysis 
relates to all 98 municipalities. We examine the scaling of larger cities, municipalities 
within the Copenhagen agglomeration, and municipalities in rural areas. We also 
distinguish between municipalities with high and low centrality. Superlinear scaling of the 
gross urban product with population size is found in all cases, with exponents between 
1.14 and 1.24. In Germany we distinguish between major cities of which the surrounding 
urban region belongs to the municipality of the city, the ‘kreisfreie Städte’ (in total 106), 
and ‘Kreise’, i.e., regions around smaller cities consisting of several municipalities (in 
total 296). A striking finding is that the scaling exponents differ substantially from one 
region to another. We find in most cases a significant superlinear scaling with exponents 
up to 1.33. Our analysis shows that urban regions with one municipality perform 
significantly better than urban regions with fragmented governance structures (more 
than one municipality). A strong relation is found between the measured residuals of the 
scaling equations and the socio-economic position of a cities assessed with a set of 
different indicators. We also investigate the relation between scaling of the Kreise and 
measures of centrality, including the Zipf-distribution. For Germany as well as for 
Denmark we find that urban scaling is related to generative and not to distributive 
processes. For the Netherlands we focus on the group of the major cities (in total 21) 
with their agglomerations and on all 60 municipalities in the Province of Zuid-Holland. We 
examined the scaling of municipalities within larger urban areas in the Netherlands. In all 
cases  significant superlinear scaling is measured with exponents up to 1.28. Our earlier 
observation that one-governance urban areas perform better than multi-governance 
urban areas is confirmed and this is in line with the above mentioned findings for 
Germany. This leads to challenging conclusions about the importance of a one-
municipality instead of a multi-municipality governance in major urban regions. A 
coherent governance of major cities and their agglomerations may create more effective 
social interactions which reinforce economic and cultural activities generating a 
substantial wealth benefit. 
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1. Introduction and Political Context  
In recent years there is a rapidly growing interest in the role of cities in our national and 
global society. Cities are regarded as the main locations of social, economic, cultural and 
innovative activity [1]. Recent research on urban metrics shows a more than proportional 
(superlinear) increase of the socio-economic performance of cities measured by the gross 
urban product (GUP) with increasing population [2, 3, 4]. In this urban scaling the 
dependence of GUP (denoted as G(P)) on population (P) is given by the power law 
relation: 
𝐺(𝑃) = 𝑎𝑃𝛽           (1) 
where the coefficient a and the urban scaling exponent β follow from the empirical data. 
In most cases the value of β is between 1.10 and 1.20. This implies that a city twice as 
large (in population) as another city can be expected to have a factor of about 2.15 
larger socio-economic performance (in terms of the gross urban product). This urban 
scaling behavior is not restricted to socio-economic variables such as GUP: it is found for 
human interactions in general and for knowledge production activities [5, 6, 7, 8] in 
cities. Indicators representing these activities appear to scale nonlinearly with the 
number of inhabitants of cities and urban agglomerations. Similar scaling is found for 
other complex systems such as universities [9]. The basis of this scaling behavior is 
provided by the theory of complex, adaptive systems [10]. Networked structures 
reinforce nonlinearly as the system grows, particularly more than proportional, i.e. 
superlinearly, described by a power law [11].  
A simple way to understand this phenomenon is by realizing that the number of nodes 
increases linearly whereas the number of links between the nodes increases superlinearly 
with the growth of a network. The nodes in the urban complex system are the 
inhabitants, social and cultural institutions, centers of education and research, firms, 
etcetera. The links between these (clustered) nodes are crucial for new developments, 
reinforcement of urban facilities, and innovation. Because they increase superlinearly, the 
socio-economic strength of the city increases more than proportional with increasing size 
of the city. For an extensive discussion of the theoretical  basis of urban scaling we refer 
to [11]. Evidently, the relation between urban scaling (which is a phenomenon at the 
meso-level) and dynamic processes in urban systems, for instance the concentration of 
business companies and professions, mobility, and other forms of traffic relations (which 
are processes at the micro-level) are important and could provide further understanding 
of scaling.  
The US research on urban scaling is about urban areas (MSA’s, metropolitan statistical 
areas) that have grown autonomously to a specific number of inhabitants, regardless of 
the formal boundaries of municipalities within an urban area. This is particularly the case 
for a recent study on urban scaling in Europe [12] where cities are defined as ‘functional 
cities’ on the basis of recent OECD-EU definitions of large metropolitan areas [13]. Urban 
scaling analysis is based on data of cities of different population size within the same 
time window, and thus urban scaling means a synchronic, ‘static’ measurement that has 
a predicting value for what happens with socioeconomic variables if, for instance, a city 
(i.e., urban area) doubles in population in the course of time. This is, of course, different 
from a situation in which a city defined as a municipality and being the central city of the 
urban agglomeration, doubles in population by a formal  reorganization of all 
municipalities within the urban area into one new municipality. Nevertheless it is 
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probable that after some time the newly formed city should meet the scaling values as 
predicted by its new size of population. But crucial is here the interesting policy question: 
would these scaling values for the doubled population (‘created’ by municipal 
reorganization) not already be attained for the urban agglomeration as a whole, simply 
because the urban agglomeration regardless of the formal municipal boundaries already 
has this double population?  
Our previous study on the urban scaling of cities in the Netherlands [14] focused 
precisely on this problem by analyzing the scaling behavior of major cities in three 
structural and administrative modalities: the municipality of the central city, their urban 
agglomerations and their urban areas. In all three modalities superlinearity with power-
law exponents of around 1.15 was found. But remarkably, agglomerations and urban 
areas underperform if we compare for the same size of population an agglomeration or 
urban area with a city as one municipality. In other words, an urban system as one 
formal municipality (one-governance) performs better as compared to an urban 
agglomeration (multi-governance) with the same population size. Moreover, further 
analysis suggested that cities with a municipal reorganization recently and in the past 
decades have a higher probability to perform better than cities without municipal 
restructuring.  
A recent OECD study [15] supports our earlier finding. The authors conclude that in line 
with previous literature, their analysis confirms that city productivity tends to increase 
with city size. But even more important, on the governance side the authors find that 
cities (urban regions) with fragmented governance structures tend to have lower levels of 
productivity. For instance, for a given population size, a metropolitan area with twice the 
number of municipalities is associated with around six percent lower productivity. 
The urban scaling phenomenon is important for new insights into and policy for urban 
development and, particularly, for municipal reform. This may concern urban 
agglomerations where municipal reform means an enlargement of the municipality of the 
central city by discontinuation of the municipalities of the suburbs, and of smaller 
municipalities that are merged into one new municipality. Different from the usual focus 
on measuring the effect of municipal reform on expenses, the urban scaling phenomenon 
relates to the expected socio-economic profits. Possible effects per medium-sized city 
could amount to hundreds of millions of euros which means thousands of jobs per year 
and per urban area. Furthermore, the interpretation of urban scaling laws is important in 
the discussion on models of urban growth, structure and optimal size of cities and their 
regions [16, 17].   
The main goal of the study presented in this paper is (1) to examine urban scaling in 
different national systems and, with that, to find out to what extent urban scaling 
depends on characteristics of these national systems; (2) to find further empirical 
evidence of the above mentioned differences in scaling of one-governance versus multi-
governance urban systems; and (3) and to relate deviations from the average scaling 
behavior to socioeconomic characteristics of urban areas. The structure of this paper is as 
follows. We describe our data and method to investigate the urban scaling behavior in 
three European Union countries, Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands. The accents 
of our study differ for each of these three countries. For Denmark, the urban scaling is 
analyzed against the background of a nation-wide municipal reform. In the case of 
Germany, we study urban scaling in different parts of the country with considerable 
differences in economic strength. Furthermore we focus on cities that form with the 
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surrounding urban area one municipality (‘kreisfreie Städte’), on administrative units that 
consist of several municipalities (‘Kreise’). Moreover, for Denmark as well as for germany 
we examine the effects of centrality on urban scaling. In the case of  the Netherlands our 
analysis concerns major cities with agglomerations that consist of  a number of 
municipalities, here urban scaling is investigated for the central cities of the 
agglomeration, and for the agglomeration as a whole. Moreover, scaling is analyzed for 
all municipalities in the most populous province, South Holland. Also urban scaling within 
urban agglomerations is measured. Finally we discuss the results and we conclude the 
paper with a discussion of the policy implications.  
 
2.  Denmark 
2.1 Data 
Denmark with its nearly 6 million inhabitants is administratively divided in five regions 
and these regions are subdivided into municipalities. In 2007 the number of 
municipalities was reduced from 271 to 98 [18]. This municipal reform, however, mostly 
involved the smaller, more rural municipalities. Given the population size of Denmark, 
the number of major cities is restricted: seven municipalities have more than 100,000 
inhabitants and four of these are municipalities of which the central city itself has a 
population of more than 100,000 (Copenhagen, Aarhus, Odense Aalborg). These major 
cities  -except for Copenhagen- had earlier municipal reforms in the 1970’s and 1980’s 
and only Aalborg had a municipal reform in 2007. Remarkably, there has been no 
municipality reform whatsoever of the Copenhagen agglomeration (formally called the 
Capital Region of Denmark). Of the 98 Danish municipalities 26 are in the Copenhagen 
agglomeration (including Copenhagen). We collected for Denmark the following data: (1) 
gross urban product and (2) population (number of inhabitants) of all municipalities in 
Denmark for the period 1997-20151. In addition we collected for all Danish municipalities 
their surface areas2 and the population of the main town or city of the municipality3. The 
surface areas are used to calculate the population density in a municipality, and number 
of inhabitants of the main town or city within a municipality is used to calculate the 
centrality of the municipality.  
2.2 Scaling Analysis: Total Set and Subsets of Municipalities 
We first analyzed the scaling of the gross urban (municipal) product as a function of 
population for the entire set of 98 municipalities and show the results in Fig 1. We find 
that the scaling exponent is 1.16. The regression line represents the expected values of 
the gross urban (municipal) product and, as can be expected, the real values of the gross 
urban (municipal) product for the municipalities deviate from the expected values. These 
differences are called residuals; for the calculation of residuals we refer to the Appendix. 
We will discuss the meaning of residuals in urban scaling analyses later in this paper.  
In some cases the deviation of an individual city or municipality from the regression line 
can be remarkably large. In the measurement of urban scaling the effect of such 
                                                             
1 The data on Gross Domestic Product (in current prices, previous years prices and 2010-prices, chained 
values) and population at municipality level were provided by Danmarks Statistik (Statistics Denmark) 
www.dst.dk.  Data are compiled and analyzed in file DK-UrbScal.xlsx. 
2 Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_municipalities_of_Denmark.   
3
 For instance, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Esbjerg_Municipality.   
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‘outliers’ is an important issue. Indeed, as the figure suggests, the measured exponent is 
sensitive to outliers. There are several statistical tests to find out whether a data point 
can be considered as an outlier, but in most cases typical outliers are immediately visible 
in the scaling figure. A striking example is Billund (indicated with a circle in the upper 
part of Fig 1), a small municipality of about 26,000 inhabitants but with a GUP four to 
five times higher than other municipalities of similar size. The reason for this 
exceptionally high GUP is obvious: Billund is the home town of Legoland, the largest 
tourist attraction in Denmark with two million visitors per year. Furthermore, Billund 
International Airport is the second largest airport in Denmark. Billund has by far the 
largest relative increase of GUP of all Danish municipalities in the last ten years. If we 
remove Billund as an exceptional outlier the exponent is 1.18.  
Other outliers are two municipalities within the Copenhagen agglomeration, Ballerup and 
Glostrup. For instance Glostrup has twice as many employees as compared with 
municipalities of similar size because several major international companies are located 
in Glostrup. Ballerup has the highest concentration of companies and jobs after 
Copenhagen. Removing all three outliers results in a scaling exponent of 1.20. These 
observations clearly show the sensitivity of the measured scaling behavior to the 
parameter values of individual cities/municipalities.   
 
 
Fig 1. Scaling of  GUP (in 1,000 DDK) for all Danish municipalities (data: average 2013-
2015).  
In the first scaling analysis shown in Fig 1 all municipalities of Denmark were involved. In 
a further step we investigate the scaling behavior for specific subsets within the total set 
of all municipalities. To the best of our knowledge this has never been done so far. This is 
important because of the crucial question: do the urban scaling exponents depend on 
specific characteristics of the set of cities/municipalities for which the scaling is 
measured? We focus on three characteristics: population, density of a group of cities, 
and centrality in terms of density within a municipality. Urban scaling of the following 
subsets is measured.  
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(1) the municipalities with a population over 50,000; this means a subset of the larger 
municipalities; 
(2) the municipalities within the Copenhagen agglomeration; this means a subset of 
municipalities that are very close together; 
(3) municipalities with centrality <0.50; this  means a subset of mostly the smaller, more 
rural municipalities. 
 We use a simple but workable measure of centrality: the ratio of the population of the 
main town or city in the municipality to the total population of the municipality. In 
municipalities around larger cities at least half of the total population lives in the central 
city. Thus, for the typical urban areas the centrality will be above 0.50. Such urban areas 
are therefore mostly ‘monocentric’. In rural areas, however, the main towns of 
municipalities are often small with less than 10,000 inhabitants and the remaining 
inhabitants are divided over a larger number of smaller towns within the municipality. As 
a consequence, the centrality of rural area municipalities is smaller than 0.50. In such a 
situation the municipalities are more ‘polycentric’. In Fig 2 we present the results for the 
first subset, all municipalities (n=37) with a population over 50,000. We find that the 
scaling exponent is 1.14 4.  
 
Fig 2. Scaling of GUP (in 1,000 DDK) for all Danish municipalities above 50,000 
inhabitants (data: average 2013-2015).  
 
Next, we analyze the scaling of the second subset: all municipalities (n=28) within the 
Copenhagen agglomeration, see Fig 3 for a map. As shown in Fig 4, we find a scaling 
exponent 1.24. This means that also within a compact urban area the autonomous 
municipalities exhibit scaling behavior. Fig 3 also shows the outlier position of Glostrup 
and Ballerup. As discussed earlier, these municipalities are part of the compact capital 
urban region which is the main Danish economic center. Because these agglomeration 
municipalities are located at the low left side of the regression line they ‘lift’ as it were 
                                                             
4 We refer to [14] for an extensive error discussion. On the basis of these calculations we estimate that the 
95% confidence interval is within +/- 0.05 around the measured scaling exponent. 
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the regression line which causes a lower exponent if they are included, and a slightly 
higher exponent if they are excluded (1.28).  
 
Fig 3. Map of the Copenhagen agglomeration municipalities5.  
 
 
Fig 4. Scaling of GUP (in 1,000 DDK) for all municipalities within the Copenhagen 
agglomeration (data: average 2013-2015).  
 
We see that in the Copenhagen agglomeration the power law exponent is somewhat 
higher than in the case of all municipalities (Fig 1) and in the case of the municipalities 
above 50,000 inhabitants (Fig 2). This raises the question whether this higher exponent 
of urban scaling is caused by the fact that the municipalities in the Copenhagen 
agglomeration are very close together, and thus the whole subset can be seen as a 
strongly interconnected network of municipalities. If we leave out Copenhagen 
                                                             
5
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capital_Region_of_Denmark#Municipalities_of_Region_Hovedstaden.   
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municipality, the scaling exponent is even higher, 1.30. An explanation could be that 
Copenhagen municipality performs relatively less within the entire agglomeration. This 
raises the question whether this finding has consequences for the political strategy to 
abandon municipal reform of the Copenhagen agglomeration. Because we have in 
Denmark only one large urban agglomeration (Copenhagen) we investigate the urban 
scaling within several major urban agglomerations the Netherlands, see Section 4.2.3. 
The third subset relates to centrality. In order to focus on the more rural municipalities 
we measure the scaling of the Danish municipalities, not within the Copenhagen 
agglomeration, with centrality smaller than 0.50 (n=49, half of all Danish municipalities, 
we excluded Billund). The result is shown in Fig 5. We find a scaling exponent 1.14, not 
very different from the scaling exponent of all Danish municipalities (without Billund 
1.16).  
 
Fig 5. Scaling GUP (in 1,000 DDK) for all Danish municipalities with centrality <0.50 and 
not in the Copenhagen agglomeration (data: average 2013-2015).  
 
Finally, we measured the scaling behavior of all Danish municipalities with centrality 
larger than 0.50 which concerns most of the larger cities. In Fig 6 we show the results 
without the Copenhagen agglomeration. We find a scaling exponent of 1.23 (n=18). If 
we include the Copenhagen municipalities (almost all of them have centrality >0.50) the 
scaling exponent is lower, 1.14. In this case we cover practically all municipalities with 
more than 50,000 inhabitants and indeed the exponent is the same as shown in Fig 2.  
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Fig 6. Scaling of GUP (in 1,000 DDK) for Danish municipalities with centrality >0.50, we 
exclude the Copenhagen agglomeration (data average 2013-2015). 
  
Our results show that scaling behavior at the level of municipalities is present in all 
investigated contexts: major cities, rural areas, and within the large urban agglomeration 
of the Danish capital region.  
2.3  Generative versus Distributive Processes 
It is often claimed that the non-linear increase of GUP as a function of population size 
benefits the larger cities at the cost of smaller cities. Thus, scaling would be a result of 
distributive processes instead of generative processes. These latter imply that cities of all 
sizes benefit. It is not that difficult to find out what is going on. If we calculate the 
increase of GUP over a period of, for instance 10 years, there must be a clear positive 
dependence on population size if scaling would involve distributive processes. Fig 7 
shows that this is not the case. For all Danish municipalities (also for the subset of 
municipalities with centrality <0.50) we find no significant dependence of the ratio 
GUP(2014)/GUP(2005) on population size. We conclude that urban scaling is related to 
generative processes.    
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Fig 7. Increase of GUP for the Danish municipalities between 2005 and 2015 (price index: 
2010) as a function of population size.  
2.4 Discussion of Research Related to Municipal Reforms 
There is a vast amount of literature on municipal reform (also called ‘municipal 
amalgamation’ or ‘municipal mergers’) but to the best of our knowledge there is no work 
on municipal reform that take urban scaling, i.e., the disproportional increase of the 
gross urban product as a function of population, into account. Municipal reform literature 
focuses on the cost-side and not on the profit. Danish work [18, 19] focuses on the 
financially opportunistic behavior in terms of ‘last minute’ spending at the end of the 
budget year by the ‘old’ municipalities in the years before the Danish municipal reform in 
2007 took place. Similar ‘free-riding’ spending behavior was found for municipal reform 
processes in Sweden [20, 21]. In this context it was concluded that municipal reform will 
only be successful if long-term benefits of municipal reform outweigh the short-term 
costs associated with them [22]. Also for the Finnish municipal reform around 2008 the 
free-riding behavior was studied [23] and the authors suggest financial constraints 
during the process of merging municipalities to mitigate this problem. In a further Danish 
study [24] it is found that an increasing municipal size through municipal reform initially 
has an adverse effect on fiscal outcomes, but there were improvements after four to five 
years. Particularly size effects persist over time. Their overall conclusion is that rescaling 
local government through municipal reform seems to improve economic steering 
capacities and fiscal outcomes.  
 
In another Danish study [25] the authors conclude on the basis of survey data collected 
before and after the Danish municipality reform that when the size of municipalities 
increases, internal political efficacy drops. We think these findings are questionable. First, 
the survey data of the opinions of citizens concerning the municipal reform (in 2007) 
were collected practically immediately after the reform in 2008 (and partly even in the 
same year of the reform 2007). Municipal reform often evokes strong emotions of lost 
identity and feelings of resentment and it may take several years before citizens become 
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aware of the benefits. Moreover, decrease of political efficacy completely conflicts with 
the fundaments of urban scaling: the disproportional increase of social, economic and 
cultural connections as a function of size. In a study on the municipal reform in New 
Zealand [26] no evidence was found that municipal reform did improve improvement 
highway maintenance. Although their analysis is restricted to a just a very specific part of 
the efficiency in government operations, these authors used their findings to claim that 
there are no economies of scale. Also in a Swiss study [27] the authors conclude claim 
that there are no economies of scale in merged municipalities but also here this analysis 
concerns only the cost side.  
On the basis of the analysis of the expenditures of merged municipalities Finnish authors 
[28] conclude that the per capita expenditure increased more in the merged 
municipalities than in the comparison group of not-merged municipalities. Here we can 
notice that urban scaling means a disproportionally increase of the gross urban product 
and thus it is understandable that the merged municipalities have more to spend. In an 
Israeli study the author finds evidence for efficiency gains arising from municipal reform 
in his country [29]. He finds that municipal reform resulted in lower levels of 
expenditures and has not seemed to decrease the quality of services. Although the 
empirical work is restricted to relatively small municipalities, this author suggests that as 
municipalities’ size increases the benefits arising from a municipal reform decrease. Apart 
from the fact that only the cost side and not the benefits are looked at, we also found no 
indications whatsoever in the literature that a clear distinction is made in types of 
municipal reform, particularly the merging of suburban municipalities with the central city 
in a compact and densely connected urban area, versus the merging of more rural and 
less directly connected municipalities.  
 
3.  Germany 
3.1 Data 
Our second case is Germany. We now deal with a country about fifteen times larger in 
population size as compared to Denmark. Germany with about 82 million inhabitants 
consists of sixteen federal states, the Bundesländer. In total, Germany currently has 106 
kreisfreie Städte (cities of which the surrounding urban region belongs to the 
municipalities of the city; together a population of about 27,000,000) and 296 Kreise 
(regions around smaller cities consisting of several municipalities6; together about 
55,000,000 population). We analyzed the scaling of these kreisfreie cities and Kreise for 
the different Bundesländer. We clustered the Bundesländer into five regions: Nordrhein-
Westfalen (North Rhine-Westphalia) (western part of Germany); Baden-Württemberg and 
Bayern (Bavaria) (southern part of Germany); Hessen (Hesse), Rheinland-Pfalz 
(Rhineland-Palatinate), and Saarland (middle part of Germany); Bremen, Hamburg, 
Niedersachsen (Lower Saxony), and Schleswig-Holstein (northern part of Germany); 
Berlin, Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Sachsen (Saxony), Sachsen-Anhalt 
(Saxony-Anhalt) and Thüringen (Thuringia) (eastern part of Germany).  
We collected the gross urban product, number of jobs in different business sectors and 
population of all the kreisfreie cities and the Kreise; we focus in this report on the gross 
                                                             
6
 The data on gross domestic product and population at the level of kreisfreie Städte and Kreise were provided 
by the Statistisches Bundesamt https://www.destatis.de, data in www.vgrdl.de. Data are compiled and 
analyzed in file D-UrbScal.xlsx.   
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urban project (GUP). As in the Danish case, we collected for all the kreisfreie cities and 
Kreise the (land) surface areas7. Moreover, we idenified for all 238 Kreise in the western 
part of Germany the municipalities belonging to a Kreis and collected for these nearly 
9,000 municipalities data on population and surface area. 
3.2 Scaling Analysis 
Also for Germany we find that the gross urban product scales superlinearly with 
population for both the kreisfreie cities as well as for the Kreise. But we see remarkable 
differences between regions. In Fig 8 the results are shown for the traditionally industrial 
western part of Germany, Nordrhein-Westfalen. Largest city is Cologne, with a  
population of about 1,100,000. The kreisfreie cities scale with 1.33, and the Kreise with 
1.07. Generally, Kreise underperform as compared to the kreisfreie cities. We see that 
two cities, Düsseldorf and Bonn, take a strikingly strong position. This illustrates the 
problematic question when measuring points should be considered as outliers. Leaving 
Düsseldorf out of the analysis, the exponent becomes 1.27. Leaving both Düsseldorf and 
Bonn out of the analysis we find a scaling exponent of 1.25. This shows as in the case 
Denmark how the scaling exponent depends on the positions of one or a few cities in the 
entire set of cities. Nevertheless, the above also shows that the measuring scaling 
exponent does not change dramatically and remains, for North Rhine-Westphalia, 
relatively high.   
 
Fig 8. Scaling of GUP (in €) for kreisfreie cities and Kreise in Nordrhein-Westfalen (data: 
average 2012-2014).  
 
Fig 9 shows the results of the economically most booming southern part of Germany, the 
states Baden-Württemberg and Bayern (Bavaria). Largest city in this region is Munich 
with a population of about 1,500,000. The kreisfreie cities scale with 1.08, and the Kreise 
with 1.17. Again the Kreise underperform as compared to the kreisfreie cities, and we will 
see this also for all other regions discussed hereafter. Also in this analysis we see city 
with an extraordinary position: Ingolstadt. The GUP of this city is relatively very high 
                                                             
7
 For instance, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frankfurt.  
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because Ingolstadt (about 140,000 inhabitants) is home to the headquarters of the 
automobile manufacturer Audi and the headquarters of the electronic stores Media 
Markt and Saturn. Leaving Ingolstadt out of the analysis, the measured exponent does 
not change much, see Fig 9. Also two other large car industries have their headquarters 
in this part of Germany: Mercedes-Benz in Stuttgart and BMW in Munich. We see also a 
Kreis with a very strong position: Landkreis Munich. This Kreis is the region surrounding 
the city of Munich and benefits greatly from the booming economy of Munich. If we leave 
this Kreis out of the analysis, the exponent becomes 1.13. 
 
What could be the cause of the difference in scaling exponent of the cities between 
North Rhine-Westphalia on the one hand and Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria on other? 
We think that the most plausible explanation is that in North Rhine-Westphalia the two 
largest cities, Cologne and as we discussed above particularly Düsseldorf, have a high 
GUP as compared to most other cities which are considerably less flourishing (with 
exception for Bonn and also Münster). In such cases the regression line becomes steeper 
and hence we find a larger exponent. In contrast to this situation, most of the cities in 
Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria, not only the largest ones, are economically booming. 
As a result the regression is less steep and we have a lower exponent.  
 
Fig 9.  Scaling of GUP (in €) for kreisfreie cities and Kreise in Baden-Württemberg and 
Bayern (data: average 2012-2014).  
 
In Fig 10 the results for the middle part of Germany, the States Hessen (Hesse), 
Rheinland-Pfalz (Rhineland-Palatinate), and Saarland are presented. Largest city in this 
region is Frankfurt with about 750,000 inhabitants. The kreisfreie cities scale with 1.31, 
and the Kreise with 1.28.  
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Fig 10. Scaling of GUP (in €) for kreisfreie cities and Kreise in Hessen, Rheinland-Pfalz 
and Saarland (data: average 2012-2004).  
 
Fig 11 shows the results for the northern part of Germany, i.e., the states of Bremen, 
Hamburg, Niedersachsen (Lower Saxony), and Schleswig-Holstein. Largest city in this 
region is Hamburg with about 1,800,000 inhabitants. The kreisfreie cities scale with 1.09, 
and the Kreise with 1.14. In this figure we see a city which clearly is an outlier. This city 
is Wolfsburg (about 125,000 inhabitants) with a very high GUP because it is the location 
the Volkswagen headquarters and the world's biggest car plant, production of 815,000 
cars per year (2015), 70,000 employees in Wolfsburg alone. Measured in GUP per capita, 
Wolfsburg is one of the richest cities in Germany. Leaving Wolfsburg out of the analysis 
we find a scaling exponent 1.11. 
 
 
Fig 11. Scaling of GUP (in €) for kreisfreie cities and Kreise in Bremen, Hamburg, 
Niedersachsen, and Schleswig-Holstein (data: average 2012-2014).  
15 
 
In Fig 12 the results are shown for the economically problematic eastern part of 
Germany, the states Berlin, Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Sachsen (Saxony), 
Sachsen-Anhalt (Saxony-Anhalt) and Thüringen (Thuringia). Largest city in this region is 
Berlin with a population of about 3,700,000. We see that in this region urban scaling is 
hardly significant: the kreisfreie cities scale with 1.03, and the Kreise with 1.02. In all 
other regions of Germany the kreisfreie cities show scaling with exponent between 1.08 
and 1.33 and for the Kreise between 1.07 and 1.28. Apparently the mechanisms behind 
scaling, particularly the size-based non-linear reinforcing of the socioeconomic links in 
networked systems, hardly work in this part of Germany with its difficult economic 
development. A possible explanation is the decline in population in the eastern part of 
Germany and particularly the move away of talented people to other regions in Germany. 
Without Berlin the scaling exponent is 1.06 which is an indication that Berlin is 
economically underperforming.  
 
Fig 12.Scaling of GUP (in €) for kreisfreie cities and Kreise in Berlin, Brandenburg, 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Sachsen, Sachsen-Anhalt, and Thüringen (data: average 
2012-2014).  
 
In Table 1 we present an overview of the scaling exponents for the kreisfreie cities and 
Kreise in the five regions. To illustrate the economic East-West-South division of 
Germany we show in Table 2 for the five regions the gross domestic product per capita in 
absolute terms and relative compared to Germany as a whole. 
 
Region Krfr cities Kreise 
western 1.33 1.07 
southern 1.08 1.17 
middle 1.31 1.28 
northern 1.09 1.14 
eastern 1.03 1.02 
Table 1. Scaling exponents for the kreisfreie cities and Kreise in the five German regions.  
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Region GDP/capita in € rel. GDP/capita 
western 35,947 1.00 
southern 41,334 1.15 
middle 37,515 1.04 
northern 35,768 0.99 
eastern 27,414 0.76 
      
Germany 36,003 1.00 
Table 2. Gross domestic product per capita of the five regions in absolute terms and 
relative compared to Germany as a whole (data: average 2012-2014).  
We see the wealthy position of the southern region in contrast to the substantially less 
wealthy situation in the eastern part of Germany. The difference in GDP per capita is a 
factor 1.15/0.76=1.64. In Fig 13 we combine the results for the kreisfreie cities of all 
regions. Again clearly visible is  the difference in wealth between, for instance, the 
southern part of Germany (red squares, Baden-Württemberg and Bayern) and the 
eastern part  (blue squares, Berlin, Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Sachsen, 
Sachsen-Anhalt, and Thüringen). By taking the scaling results for only the southern and 
the eastern part of Germany this difference shows up even more strikingly, see Fig 14.  
  
Fig 13. Comparison of the scaling of GUP (in €) for all kreisfreie cities, grouped by region 
(compilation of the same data as presented in Figs 8-12).  
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Fig 14. Same as Fig 13, but now only the southern region in comparison with the eastern 
region.  
 
Using the parameters of the measured scaling, we find a difference in average GUP of 
about 1.96, somewhat higher than the difference in the GDP per capita as calculated on 
the basis of Table 2. The above findings clearly show a problem in the measurement of 
scaling in an entire country: the numerous smaller kreisfreie cities in the southern part 
are at a high level of GUP, thus they will ‘lift’ the regression line at the lower population 
side thereby lowering considerably the exponent of the scaling. Fig 15 shows this effect: 
if we calculate the scaling exponent for all German kreisfreie cities together, we find 
1.03, this is lower than the scaling exponents of the kreisfreie cities of all German 
regions, and it is hardly significant. Without the largest city, Berlin, the scaling exponent 
is 1.05.  
 
Fig 15. Scaling of GUP (in €) with population of all kreisfreie cities together.  
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A crucial element in our study is the question how governance structures influence 
socioeconomic performance. We made the following analysis to find first indications. In a 
number of Kreise the administrative centers are cities that are not kreisfreie cities 
(because they formally belong to a Kreis) but they can be considerably larger than 
smaller kreisfreie cities8. As a consequence, there is an overlap in population size as well 
as density between kreisfreie cities and Kreise. In such cases, Kreise are densely 
populated urban regions, just as the kreisfreie cities. We created a set of kreisfreie cities 
and of Kreise with similar population size and similar density (>400 inhabitants/km
2
) and 
calculated the scaling exponents for both groups. The results are shown in Fig 16. We 
see that the one-municipality urban regions (the kreisfreie cities) overperform the multi-
municipality urban regions.  
 
Fig 16. Comparison of the scaling (GUP, in €) of kreisfreie cities with Kreise of similar 
population density (Germany as a whole).  
 
3.3 Residual Analysis and Comparison with Other Socio-Economic Data 
We calculated for all German kreisfreie cities and Kreise the residuals of the scaling 
equations. Residuals are a measure of the deviations of the observed (i.e., real) value 
from the expected value as established by the scaling equation. Qualitatively speaking, 
residuals are a measure of the deviation of a city, municipality, or Kreis from the 
expected value given by the regression line through all measuring points of a specific set. 
(see the Appendix for a discussion of the mathematical procedure to calculate the 
residuals). Analysis of the residuals may reveal local characteristics of individual cities in 
terms of success or failure relative to other cities. Positive residuals indicate that a city 
performs better than expected. We did not find any significant relation between 
population density of both the kreisfreie cities as well as the Kreise and the value of the 
residuals.   
                                                             
8 An example is Neuss (Nord Rhine-Westphalia) with about 155,000 inhabitants, but this city is not kreisfrei, it 
is the administrative center of the Rhein-Kreis Neuss which has a  population of about 450,000. The Bavarian 
city Schwabach on the other hand with about 41,000 inhabitants is a kreisfreie city. 
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The intriguing question now is: what about the relation between the residuals calculated 
on the basis of GUP scaling with population on the one hand, and on the other hand the 
socio-economic position of a city as assessed by a combination of a large number of 
different quantitative indicators? The German socioeconomic research agency Prognos 
AG9 performed an investigation of the future perspectives of (kreisfreie) cities and 
regions (Kreise) in Germany on the basis of a number of indicators and published the 
results in the report Zukunftatlas 2016 [30]. In total 29 indicators related to 
demographics, job market, competition and innovation, welfare and social life quality 
were used to assess strength and dynamism of cities and regions. On the basis of these 
assessments, a ranking of all cities and regions was created. For details we refer to the 
above mentioned report [30].   
Fig 17 illustrates the economic differences between the regions in Germany based on 
perceived opportunities for the near future. We clearly see the division between the 
eastern region and the other regions in Germany.  By selecting the kreisfreie cities from 
the Prognos ranking, we find that of the top-20 cities 17 have a residual larger than 0.15, 
see Table 3, upper part. For the bottom-20 cities we find that 16 have a residual smaller 
than -0,15, see Table 3 lower part.    
 
 
Fig 17. Assessment of future economic opportunities for the German regions.10        
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
9 See www.prognos.com. 
10 https://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article155737236/Diese-zehn-Regionen-haben-die-besten-
Zukunftschancen.html.  
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Prognos  residual kreisfreie   Prognos  residual kreisfreie 
ranking   city   ranking   city 
1 0.42 München   87 -0.21 Remscheid 
2 1.05 Ingolstadt   88 -0.68 Delmenhorst 
3 1.15 Wolfsburg   89 -0.18 Lübeck 
4 0.68 Erlangen   90 -0.46 Halle 
5 0.57 Stuttgart   91 -0.36 Suhl 
6 0.46 Darmstadt   92 -0.15 Krefeld 
7 0.71 Frankfurt aM   93 -0.51 Gera 
8 0.65 Regensburg   94 -0.27 Hagen 
9 0.21 Heidelberg   95 -0.07 Wilhelmshaven 
10 0.50 Ulm   96 -0.33 Cottbus 
11 0.26 Hamburg   97 -0.17 Schwerin 
12 0.53 Düsseldorf   98 -0.14 Neumünster 
13 0.63 Coburg   99 -0.26 Duisburg 
14 -0.27 Dresden   100 -0.46 Oberhausen 
15 0.28 Landshut   101 -0.17 Pirmasens 
16 0.30 Würzburg   102 -0.40 Brandenburg ad H 
17 0.30 Bamberg   103 -0.62 Herne 
18 -0.16 Jena   104 -0.44 Dessau-Roßlau 
19 -0.01 Braunschweig   105 -0.12 Bremerhaven 
20 0.51 Bonn   106 -0.36 Gelsenkirchen 
Table 3. Left part: Top-20 cities; right part: bottom-20 cities. Cities in italics have 
residuals lower than 0.15 in the case of the top-20, and higher than -0.15 in the case of 
the bottom-20.  
We see that there is a strong relation between the measured residuals in this study and 
the assessment of future perspectives of cities by the Prognos method.  
3.4  Urban Scaling and Mono- versus Polycentrality 
In our analysis of urban scaling in Denmark we discussed the scaling behavior for specific 
subsets within the total set of all municipalities. One of the distinctions we made was 
related to centrality in terms of density within a municipality. With centrality we measure 
the extent to which residents, or jobs, or GUP, are divided over all cities/towns within a 
municipality. Given the availability of data, the most workable  definition of centrality is 
the ratio of the population of the main city/town in the municipality to the total 
population of the municipality. As we discussed in the case of Denmark, in municipalities 
around larger cities at least half of the total population lives in the central city. Thus, for 
the typical urban areas the centrality will be above 0.50. Such urban areas are therefore 
mostly monocentric. This is typical the situation for the German kreisfreie cities: regions 
around major cities are one municipality, and by far the most people and jobs are in the 
central city.  
 
Similar to the centrality of one specific municipality (based on the size distribution of 
cities/towns within a municipality), we can go one aggregation level higher and calculate 
the centrality of regions around smaller cities with generally 10 to 15 municipalities 
within the region. This is typical the situation for the German Kreise. If the distribution of 
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population over the municipalities within a Kreis is sharply peaked, then one city/town 
within the Kreis plays the leading role and we have a monocentric region. With a flatter 
distribution we have a more polycentric region. The Zipf-distribution is a size-rank 
distribution of municipalities within a region, for instance within a Kreis, according to 
their population size. This ranking should theoretically follow a power law with exponent  
-1.0, but in reality this is certainly not always the case [31].  Deviations from this value 
can then be used as a centrality measure and a criterion for mono- or polycentricity. For 
instance, if the power law exponent is -1.5, the distribution is steeper and the Kreis is 
more monocentric. If the power law exponent is less than -0.4 we have a flat distribution 
and the Kreis is more polycentric.  
Does the distribution of population over municipalities with a Kreis follow a power law? 
We analyzed the Zipf-distribution of municipalities within all 236 Kreise in the western 
part of Germany. We find a wide variety in power law exponents and in the statistical 
significance of these power laws. As examples we show in Fig 18 the Zipf-distribution of 8 
Kreise in the German states Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria, based on the largest six 
municipalities within the Kreis. We notice that in some cases (upper part of Fig 18) there 
is a power law distribution with high significance, but the exponent varies greatly 
between –0.43 and -1.18. As discussed earlier, in the case of a flatter distribution 
(exponent -0.43, Rhein-Neckar Kreis) we have a more polycentric Kreis, and in the case 
of a steeper distribution (exponent -1.18, Garmisch-Partenkirchen) the Kreis is more 
monocentric. An example of a more extreme case is Kreis Kelheim, see middle part of Fig 
18. This shows the typical problem in the determination of the Zipf exponent: if we 
include the five largest municipalities of this Kreis in the measurement, we find with high 
significance an exponent -0.17. But if we include the next municipality the exponent is -
0.40, however, as can be expected, with a much lower significance. The lower part of Fig 
18 show more of these cases, without fitting the distribution with a power law.  
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Fig 18. Examples of size distribution within Kreise in the German states Baden-
Württemberg and Bavaria. Upper part: size distribution follows power law; middle part: 
effect of number of municipalities in the size-ranking distribution; lower part: more 
examples of this problem.  
Nevertheless we find an exponent with high significance (R2>0.90) for the vast majority 
of Kreise and on this empirical basis we conclude that the calculation of the Zipf-
distribution is useful in the analysis of centrality. We also applied two other measures of 
centrality in which statistical uncertainty plays no role. First a similar one as used in the 
case of the Danish municipalities but now at the aggregation level of a Kreis, i.e., the 
ratio of the population of the largest municipality to the total population of the Kreis, 
denoted as c1; and second the ratio of the population of the largest municipality to the 
population of the of the second largest municipality in a Kreis, denoted as c2. Comparison 
of Zipf exponents, c1 and c2 values for all 236 (West-)German Kreise shows that the 
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strongest correlation is between Zipf exponents and c1 values (R
2=0.54, so this 
correlation is not very strong).  
 
We calculated the scaling of GUP with population for all Kreise as a function of the three 
centrality measures and compare this scaling for the top and the bottom of the centrality 
distribution. As shown in Fig 19, upper part, we find that the scaling of the Kreise within 
the top-25% and those within the bottom-25% of the Zipf-exponent show similar 
exponents but the Kreise in the bottom-25% underperform. The same is the case for 
centrality measure c1, see middle part of Fig 19. For centrality measure c2 there is no 
difference between the top and the bottom of the distribution, see lower part of Fig 19. 
In conclusion we find that the difference in scaling exponent in all these cases is hardly 
significant, but that the Kreise with a higher Zipf-exponent (in absolute terms) and a 
higher c1 value (i.e., larger degree of monocentrality) perform better. These differences 
seem small at first glance when looking at the figures, but given the logarithmic scale, 
the difference in GUP is quite substantial (about 14% in GUP). 
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Fig 19. Scaling of the German (western part) Kreise in the top-25% and the bottom-25% 
of the Zipf exponent (upper part), c1 values (middle part) and c2 values (lower part).  
3.5  Generative versus distributive processes 
In Section 2.3 we discussed the issue of generative versus distributive processes related 
to urban scaling. We showed that an analysis of all Danish municipalities provides 
evidence that scaling is related to generative processes. Fig 20 shows that we find similar 
results for Germany.  
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Fig 20. Increase of GUP between 2005 and 2014 as a function of population size.            
For both the kreisfreie cities as well as the Kreise in Germany no significant dependence 
of the ratio GUP(2014)/GUP(2005) on population size is found. Again we conclude that 
scaling is related to generative processes.    
 
4.  The Netherlands 
4.1 Data 
The Netherlands with around 17,000,000 inhabitants is administratively divided in 12 
provinces and 380 municipalities (December 2018). In this study we focus on two cases: 
(1) 21 major cities in the Netherlands for which the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) 
has defined urban agglomerations and urban areas; in total the urban areas of these 20 
major cities comprise 150 municipalities; and (2) the Province of South-Holland (PZH), 
the most populated province of the Netherlands (density 1,300 inhabitants/km2) with 
nearly 3,6 million inhabitants, and 52 municipalities (January 2019); the major urban 
regions in PZH  -Rotterdam, The Hague, Leiden, Dordrecht-  are also included in case 1. 
We collected in both cases for the period 2013-2016 for all municipalities the following 
variables: (1) number of inhabitants (population); (2) employment (number of jobs); (3) 
gross urban product; (4) productivity11. In addition we collected for all municipalities in 
case 1 the land surface areas (in km2, total surface area corrected for water surface 
area) and for each of the 129 suburban cities the distances (in km) to the center of the 
central city. 
 
 
                                                             
11 The GUP data are obtained from the national information system on employment LISA, www.lisa.nl, and the 
data on the population of municipalities from Statline, the data system of the Netherlands Central Bureau of 
Statistics (CBS).  
26 
 
4.2   Major cities in the Netherlands  
4.2.1 Scaling Analysis 
For major cities the Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) defines two types of 
agglomerations. First, the urban agglomeration which is the central city and the 
immediately connected suburban cities that are separate municipalities. Second, the 
urban area in which in addition to the urban agglomeration all other suburban cities 
(again separate municipalities) that are closely socio-economically connected to the 
central city are included. The largest urban area, Amsterdam, counts 1.7 million 
inhabitants. We conducted the scaling analysis for three urban modalities:  
(1) the major cities as a municipality (in total 21);  
(2) their urban agglomerations (in total the 21 central cities and 44 suburban cities); and  
(3) their urban areas (in total the 21 central cities, the 40 suburban cities in the 
agglomerations, and in addition 89 suburban cities to complete the urban areas).  
In Fig 21 (three parts) we present the scaling of the 21 major cities as well as for their 
agglomerations and urban areas for the number of jobs, productivity, and GUP. Focusing 
on the GUP scaling we see that the major cities scale with the following exponents: 1.20 
for cities as a municipality (i.e., one-governance structure); 1.16 for the urban 
agglomerations of these cities and 1.17 for the urban areas of these cities (in these two 
latter cases: multi-governance structure). On the basis of our earlier calculations [14] we 
estimate that the 95% confidence interval is within +/- 0.05 around the measured 
scaling exponents. Our observations suggest a slight decrease of the exponent from 
central cities as municipalities to urban agglomerations and urban areas, is in good 
agreement with our earlier analysis [14].  
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Fig 21. Scaling of the 21 major cities with number of jobs (first part), productivity (in 
1,000 Euro) (second part), and GUP (in 1,000 Euro) (third part). The central cities are 
indicated with blue diamonds (CC), their agglomeration with red squares (Aggl) and their 
urban areas with light green triangles (Area).  
Also the remarkable phenomenon discussed in [14] is confirmed again: the absolute 
value of the gross urban product for both the urban agglomerations and the urban areas 
is lower than for the central cities as municipalities. Thus, although both types of multi-
governance urban region modalities scale with population, they underperform as 
compared to cities defined as municipalities. In other words, an urban area consisting of 
one municipality (one-governance) performs substantially better as compared with an 
urban area with the same number of inhabitants but consisting of several municipalities. 
And this difference is large in terms of GUP. For instance, the expected value for CC 
(one-governance) is in the case of 200,000 inhabitants around 20% higher than the 
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expected value for Aggl (multi-governance). This gives a first indication of the profit that 
can be made by the municipal merging of a central city with its directly connected 
suburban municipalities. Even if only 10% of these expectations is fulfilled, we are still 
talking about an amount of 100 million Euros per medium-sized city mainly in the form of  
thousands of jobs.  
 
In Fig 22 we show the scaling of GUP for all the municipalities in the urban areas, in total 
150, which is nearly half of all municipalities in the Netherlands. The most likely 
explanation of the high scaling exponent 1.27 is that particularly the smaller suburbs are 
typical residential municipalities and consequently they have a relatively low GUP. This 
pulls down the regression line resulting in a higher exponent. We see several outliers, 
i.e., municipalities with an exceptionally high residual. We give two examples. The one at 
the lower end of the population scale is Zoeterwoude, a municipality in the Leiden 
agglomeration. This outlier position is mainly due to the presence of the large Heineken 
beer factory. The outlier at the higher end of the population scale is Haarlemmermeer, a 
larger municipality in the Amsterdam urban area. Its exceptional position is very well 
understandable, Amsterdam International Airport Schiphol, the fourth largest airport in 
Europe, is located in Haarlemmermeer. If Zoeterwoude is removed from the analysis, the 
scaling exponent is 1.28. Removal of Haarlemmermeer gives a scaling exponent of 1.25.  
 
 
Fig 22. Scaling of all municipalities in the urban region of the 21 major cities with GUP (in 
1,000 Euro). Circles indicate examples of outliers, see discussion in main text.  
4.2.2 Analysis and Comparison with Other Socio-Economic Data 
We calculated the residuals of the scaling equations given in Fig 21 for the major cities 
and the suburban municipalities. As discussed earlier in the context of the urban scaling 
of German cities, analysis of the residuals may reveal local characteristics of individual 
cities in terms of success or failure relative to other cities [3]. In the Netherlands a socio-
economic assessment of the 50 largest cities is published annually in the Atlas voor 
Gemeenten (AvG, Atlas for Municipalities) [32]. These assessments are predominantly 
based on qualitative indicators. Of these cities, 32 are within the urban 
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agglomerations/areas of the 21 major cities (either as the central city, or as a major 
suburb). For these 32 cities we compared their residuals with the ranking position (score) 
in de socio-economic index of the AvG 201712. These residuals (resCC) are related to the 
scaling of the 21 major cities, i.e., the residuals calculated with the scaling equation of 
the CC-regression line in Fig 21. To avoid the influence of the individual residuals as well 
as individual AvG scores, we calculated average values for blocks of five cities according 
to the ranking of the residuals, see Table 4. For instance, in the second column 0.38 is 
the average residual of the top-5 cities (in terms of the residuals), and 18.0 is their 
average AvG score, and so on for the next blocks of five cities.  
  resCC  av res  score av score 
Haarlemmermeer 0.98   24   
Utrecht 0.25   22   
Den Bosch 0.24   19   
Zwolle 0.23   17   
Eindhoven 0.22 0.38 8 18.0 
Velsen 0.18   12   
Amsterdam 0.18   13   
Arnhem 0.14   -11   
Amstelveen 0.12   23   
Amersfoort 0.08 0.14 21 11.6 
Leeuwarden 0.04   -3   
Groningen  0.03   2   
Heerlen 0.02   -21   
Leiden 0.01   15   
Maastricht 0.00 0.02 -9 -3.2 
Hengelo 0.00   -6   
Breda -0.02   20   
Delft -0.03   0   
Apeldoorn -0.05   9   
Schiedam -0.05 -0.03 -15 1.6 
Nijmegen -0.06   -8   
Rotterdam -0.11   -17   
Zoetermeer -0.14   3   
Dordrecht -0.16   -19   
Tilburg -0.22 -0.14 7 -6.8 
Den Haag  -0.25   -16   
Enschede -0.26   -24   
Haarlem -0.39   14   
Almere -0.43   -12   
Vlaardingen -0.50   -20   
Leidschendam-Voorburg -0.65   4   
Purmerend -0.67 -0.45 -1 -7.9 
Table 4. Comparison of residuals with scores in the AvG socio-economic review.  
We find a correlation of R2=0.79. This is just a simple test but it confirms the findings in 
the case of Germany: a significant correlation of the measured residuals based on the 
GUP scaling with socio-economic indicators from other sources.  
 
                                                             
12 Ranking data on page 232. To make comparison with the positive and negative residuals easier, we take 25-
a where a is the ranking score given in the AvG. 
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4.2.3 Scaling within Urban Areas 
We found that scaling of the municipalities within the Copenhagen agglomeration has a 
somewhat higher power law exponent (1.24) as compared to the set of all Danish 
municipalities. Given that the Netherlands has more larger urban areas with suburban 
municipalities around the central city, we analyzed the urban scaling within the four 
largest urban areas in the Netherlands, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht, 
and within four medium-sized urban areas, Eindhoven, Haarlem, Leiden, Dordrecht 13.   
 
 
Fig 23. Scaling of GUP for all municipalities within the urban areas of Amsterdam, 
Rotterdam, The Hague, Utrecht (upper part of figure), and of Eindhoven, Haarlem, Leiden 
and Dordrecht (lower part of figure).  
                                                             
13 The population size of these urban areas are (2018): Amsterdam 1,728,000; Rotterdam 1,256,000; The Hague 
1,096,000; Utrecht 682,000; Eindhoven 433,000; Haarlem 425,000; Leiden 350,000; Dordrecht  289,000. 
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The results of the scaling analysis are presented in Fig 23. We find that the scaling 
exponents of these urban areas are within a range from 1.03 (Dordrecht) to 1.23 
(Leiden) with an average value of 1.15. The results are in line with what we have found 
for the Copenhagen agglomeration: the scaling within urban areas does not behave 
differently from urban scaling of, for instance, all cities or municipalities in a country. 
This, however, does not detract from our findings that multi-governance urban region 
modalities underperform as compared to one-governance urban areas. 
4.3  Province of South-Holland 
4.3.1 Scaling Analysis 
In Fig 24 the scaling of the number of jobs (upper part), productivity (middle part) and 
GUP (lower part) with population for all PZH municipalities is shown. Again we see the 
municipality of Zoeterwoude as an outlier. As discussed earlier, outliers affect the 
measured scaling exponent, and we indicate within the figure the scaling exponent 
without the outlier.  
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Fig 24. Scaling of the number of jobs with population (upper part), of productivity (in 
1,000 Euro) (middle part) and of GUP (in 1,000 Euro) (lower part) for all municipalities in 
the Province South-Holland.   
Similar to the analysis of the Danish and German data, we focus on GUP. We find that 
(without outlier) the entire set of PZH municipalities scales with exponent 1.15, a value 
again within the range of scaling exponents found in this study.  
4.3.2 Residual Analysis in Provincial and in National Context 
On the basis of the scaling equation found for the GUP (Fig 24, lower part) we calculated 
the residuals for all PZH municipalities (excluding outlier). The results are shown in Fig 
25. We see that of the major cities Rotterdam and Leiden have relatively large positive 
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residuals, whereas the residuals for The Hague (‘s-Gravenhage) and Dordrecht are 
around zero. High positive residuals are found for Rijswijk (The Hague agglomeration) 
and Sliedrecht (Dordrecht agglomeration). A remarkably low residual is found for 
Voorschoten (Leiden agglomeration).  
 
Fig 25. Residuals of all PZH municipalities14.  
We now focus on the four major urban regions in PZH (Rotterdam, The Hague, Leiden, 
Dordrecht). An overview of the population size of these urban regions is presented in 
Table 5.  
  CC U Aggl U Area 
        
Rotterdam 623,872 1,032,380 1,230,088 
Den Haag 514,596 662,605 1,061,443 
Leiden 121,762 204,885 345,973 
Dordrecht 118,797 220,233 287,037 
Table 5. Population size (average 2014-2016) for the central cities (CC), their 
agglomerations (U Aggl) and their urban areas (U Area). See Table 6 for the 
municipalities involved.  
We use the findings of the analysis of the 21 major cities discussed in Section 4.2.1. This 
means that the PZH urban areas are now assessed in a national context. Table 6 shows 
the results for the calculation of a set of residuals. The explanation of the table is as 
follows. In the first column the municipalities within the urban areas are given. Directly 
below the central city we find the municipalities of the urban agglomeration (for instance 
in the case of Rotterdam these are the municipalities up to and including Krimpen aan 
den Ijssel) and in addition the municipalities of the wider urban area (for Rotterdam the 
                                                             
14 Excluding Zoeterwoude. Calculated with the same scaling equation as the other PZH municipalities, the 
residual of Zoeterwoude is 1.27.   
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municipalities Ridderkerk up to and including Lansingerland). The column resAll gives the 
values of the residuals of the four cities and their suburban municipalities in relation to 
the scaling of all municipalities in the urban areas, in total 150 (shown in Fig 22). In the 
next column we find resCC, the residuals in relation to the scaling of the 21 major cities, 
i.e., the residuals calculated with the scaling equation of the CC-regression line in Fig 21, 
lower part (these resCC are also used in Table 4). It is a measure of over- or 
underperformance of cities (as municipalities) in a national context. We see that with the 
exception of Leiden, the other three cities Rotterdam, The Hague and Dordrecht 
substantially underperform in this national context. In comparison, the resCC values for 
other major cities in the Netherlands are for instance Amsterdam 0.18, Eindhoven 0.22 
and Utrecht 0.25.    
Residual resUAg is calculated with the scaling equation of the Aggl-regression line in Fig 
21, lower part. It is a measure of over- or underperformance of urban agglomerations 
(central city with the immediately connected suburban cities that are separate 
municipalities), again in a national context. The results are quite remarkable. The 
Rotterdam agglomeration does not improve as compared to the Rotterdam resCC, which 
means that currently the suburban municipalities are not in a position to reinforce the 
Rotterdam urban agglomeration. We observe a similar situation for Leiden. The opposite 
is found for the Hague and Dordrecht. In our opinion resUAgCC is the most interesting 
measure. If an agglomeration would be a one-governance city, the expected position 
should be on the CC regression line. Thus resUAgCC indicates the difference in gross 
urban product between what the agglomeration would ‘earn’ if it was a one-governance 
city, and what it actually earns now, in a fragmented, multi-governance urban system. In 
all four cases it is clear that the multi-governance structure does not succeed in attaining 
the expected one-governance level of the gross urban product. Urban agglomerations 
that perform better in this respect are for instance Amersfoort, Amsterdam, Arnhem, 
Eindhoven, Groningen, Den Bosch and Utrecht. The above results are our main 
observations. In a similar way we calculated resUAr and resUArCC in relation to the UAr-
regression line. In order not to complicate the discussion we refer to Fig 26 for a further 
explanation of the different residuals and leave the conclusions to the reader.  
We conclude this section with a remark about population densities. Are multi-governance 
urban agglomeration less densely populated than one-governance urban agglomeration? 
If so, it could be an explanation why most of the urban agglomerations in the 
Netherlands are characterized by underperformance. But this is not the case. A detailed 
analysis in our earlier study [14] showed that population density does not relate to the 
measured residuals. In other words, over- and underperformance of cities as compared 
to the expected GUP values cannot be attributed to population density. The Rotterdam 
agglomeration has 8 municipalities, and the overall density is 2680 inhabitants/km2. 
Compare this with two German harbor cities, Hamburg and Bremen, both are kreisfrei, 
i.e., their agglomerations consist of only one municipality. The densities for these one-
governance urban regions are for Hamburg 2304 inhabitants/km2 and for Bremen 1682 
inhabitants/km2, well below the multi-governance Rotterdam agglomeration. The 
densities of the multi-governance The Hague agglomeration (4 municipalities) and the 
multi-governance Leiden agglomeration (5 municipalities) are 3656 and 2775 
inhabitants/km2, considerably higher than the population densities of Hamburg and 
Bremen or of Cologne and Düsseldorf with 2542 and 2744 inhabitants/km2, respectively. 
Again, we conclude that population densities are most probably not a main factor in the 
difference of GUP between one-governance and multi-governance urban areas. 
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  resAll resCC resUAg resUAgCC resUAr resUArCC 
              
Rotterdam -0.17 -0.11         
Schiedam 0.06 -0.05         
Nissewaard -0.52 -0.62         
Vlaardingen -0.38 -0.50         
Capelle aan den IJssel 0.41 0.28         
Barendrecht 0.39 0.24         
Maassluis -0.39 -0.57         
Krimpen aan den IJssel 0.01 -0.18 -0.17 -0.38     
              
Ridderkerk 0.28 0.13         
Hellevoetsluis -0.43 -0.60         
Albrandswaard 0.31 0.11         
Brielle 0.44 0.20         
Westvoorne 0.00 -0.25         
Lansingerland 0.07 -0.06     -0.11 -0.46 
              
              
Den Haag -0.29 -0.25         
Leidschendam-Voorburg -0.54 -0.65         
Rijswijk (ZH.) 0.66 0.51         
Wassenaar 0.53 0.32 -0.15 -0.34     
              
Zoetermeer -0.07 -0.14         
Westland 0.25 0.16         
Delft 0.06 -0.03         
Pijnacker-Nootdorp -0.51 -0.65         
Midden-Delfland 0.19 -0.04     -0.12 -0.47 
              
              
Leiden 0.09 0.01         
Leiderdorp 0.02 -0.18         
Voorschoten -0.57 -0.77         
Oegstgeest -0.10 -0.31         
Zoeterwoude 1.51 1.22 -0.11 -0.25     
              
Teylingen 0.14 -0.04         
Noordwijk 0.38 0.18         
Noordwijkerhout 0.20 -0.04         
Katwijk -0.35 -0.48     -0.14 -0.45 
              
              
Dordrecht -0.08 -0.16         
Zwijndrecht 0.14 -0.02         
Papendrecht 0.32 0.14         
Sliedrecht 0.63 0.42 -0.10 -0.25     
              
Hardinxveld-Giessendam 0.38 0.15         
Alblasserdam 0.31 0.09         
Hendrik-Ido-Ambacht -0.24 -0.43     -0.06 -0.36 
Table 6  Set of residuals for the PZH urban agglomerations and urban areas. 
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Fig 26  Explanation of the residuals in relation to the regression lines of the 21 major 
cities, their agglomerations, and their urban areas. 
4.3.3. Some first observations in relation to municipal reform 
Finally, we focused our analysis on the 10 PZH municipalities that have been reformed in 
the period 2000-2009 and for which the municipal reform involved an increase of at least 
10% in population as compared to the largest city/town in the new municipality. We take 
2010 as the last year of our analysis in order to give the newly formed municipalities 
time to adjust to the new situation. We calculated the ratio of the GUP for the year 2016 
and the GUP for the year 2013. We find for the 10 reformed municipalities 1.14 
[sd=0.07], and for the 50 not-reformed municipalities 1.08 [sd=0.05], a difference of 
about 6% to the advantage of the reformed municipalities.  
  
5. Conclusions and policy implications  
In most earlier work on urban scaling the ‘cities’ are in fact larger agglomerations around 
central cities. It is emphasized [3] that these agglomerations are socioeconomic units 
and therefore the defining feature of cities, this in contrast to administrative definitions 
which are regarded as more arbitrary. We however argue that governance structure of 
urban agglomerations does have a great influence on the socio-economic strength of 
cities and their agglomerations. This governance structure often has very longstanding 
and deep historical, political and social grounds that are frequently the basis of emotional 
attitudes against the central city. Emotions are related to issues such as identity, 
supposed threats (lower income housing, higher taxes, the loss of green space and local 
facilities), and proximity of local authorities. Particularly identity is a very strong emotion. 
Recently Fukuyama stated that for the recognition of our identity we are prepared to 
sacrifice safety, justice and democracy [32]. Given the findings of this study, we could 
add: sacrifice a piece of prosperity.  
 
In this study we have investigated the scaling behavior of all Danish municipalities, all 
German kreisfreie cities (major cities of which the surrounding urban region belongs to 
the municipality of the city) and all Kreise (regions around smaller cities consisting of 
several municipalities). For the Netherlands we analyzed the group of major cities 
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including their urban agglomerations and urban areas; and all municipalities in the 
Province of South-Holland (PZH).  
In the case of Denmark we analyzed the scaling of larger cities, municipalities within the 
Copenhagen agglomeration, and municipalities in rural areas. We also distinguished 
between municipalities with high and low centrality. In all cases superlinear urban scaling 
of the gross urban/municipal product with population was found with scaling exponents 
between 1.14 and 1.24. Also in the case of Germany we find significant superlinear 
scaling of the gross urban product with population size with exponents up to 1.33. 
Moreover, our analysis shows that urban regions with one municipality (one-governance, 
kreisfreie cities) perform better than urban regions with fragmented governance 
structures (more than one municipality, multi-governance). We find a strong relation 
between the measured residuals of the scaling equations and the socio-economic position 
of a cities as measured with a combination of different socioeconomic indicators.   
In both Dutch cases -the 21 major cities with their agglomerations and all municipalities 
in the Province of Zuid-Holland (PZH)- again significant superlinear scaling is measured 
with exponents up to 1.28. Our earlier observation that one-governance urban areas 
perform better than multi-governance urban areas is confirmed and this is in line with 
the findings for Germany in this study.  
Undoubtedly, the independent municipalities within urban agglomerations will have 
socioeconomic connections. But this does not mean that this multi-governance structure 
within these agglomerations has a strong cohesiveness and synergy resulting in an 
optimal social, economic and cultural coherence. Quite the contrary, the independent, 
autonomous municipalities within urban agglomerations and urban areas each have their 
own political and social agenda. Even a medium-sized compact urban area may consist of 
ten autonomous municipalities with in total about 400,000 inhabitants. Every four years 
there are new municipal elections which may involve a complete change of political 
orientation. This often results in new policy making in which previous collaboration 
agreements and partnerships within the agglomeration may be revised or even 
eliminated thereby eroding the culture of mutual confidence. As a consequence, urban 
agglomerations may suffer considerably for many decades from the lack of vigor and 
perseverance in the realization of infrastructural, social, cultural and economic 
(particularly industrial business areas) facilities.  
Our observations in this study lead to challenging conclusions about the importance of a 
one-municipality instead of a multi-municipality governance in major urban regions. A 
coherent governance of major cities and their agglomerations may create more effective 
social interactions which reinforce economic and cultural activities generating a 
substantial wealth benefit. Even in the case that not most, or all, of the differences in 
performance between central cities and their urban agglomerations and urban areas can 
be explained by incoherent governance, then still a substantial part of the expected 
benefits would generate a significant increase of wealth and disposable resources. For 
instance, if the benefit would be only 10% of the expected value, then we are still talking 
about a hundred million Euros per medium-sized city, which means thousands of jobs.  
Inter-municipal collaboration is meant to improve the relations between central cities and 
their suburban municipalities, but it is not known how far the improvements would go if 
the urban area would change into a one-governance structure. This study provides strong 
indications for the benefits of a one-governance structure. These indications are in 
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accordance with the findings of the OECD study on the role of urban governance in 
making cities more productive [13]. Increasing size of cities lead to greater 
professionalization, higher organizational specialization and increased administrative 
capacity. But above all, increasing means a disproportional increase of socioeconomic 
strength. Just like the recent Dutch study on urban regions as drivers of economic growth 
[34] our work underlines the importance of more effective governance in urban areas. 
Given that major cities are important drivers of a country’s socio-economic development, 
the lack of coherent urban governance may severely hamper developments in national 
wealth. US researchers concluded in a recent paper: “ ……The Netherlands could become 
even richer simply by growing their cities further” [12, p. 10]. 
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Appendix:   
Calculation of the residuals  
We calculated the residuals of the power-law scaling of the gross urban product with population for 
the analysis of the real performance as compared to the expected value. The mathematical procedure is 
as follows. 
A power-law relation between for instance the gross urban product (G) and population (P) can be 
written as:  
𝐺(𝑃) = 𝑎𝑃𝛽           (A1) 
We find empirically (as an example see Fig 1, upper part) the value 66.19 for the coefficient a and 
1.14 for the power-law exponent ẞ. 
Denoting the observed value of the gross urban product for each specific city with Gi, we calculate the 
residuals ξi  of the scaling distribution of each city as follows [3, 14]: 
𝜉𝑖    =  𝑙𝑛[𝐺𝑖 /𝐺(𝑃)] = 𝑙𝑛[𝐺𝑖 /𝑎𝑃
𝛽]        (A2) 
The residuals are also used to test the heteroscedasticity of the data, we refer to our earlier paper [14]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
